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Introduction
The paper is about using the philosoph-ical anthropology of Helmuth Pless-
ner as a basic methodological approach
for a cumulative science, one unified sci-
ence that would dissolve interdisciplinary
boundaries and prejudices. My starting
point is the thesis that there actually is only
one science split into two distinct parts,
natural sciences and humanities, which de-
pend on each other to achieve their com-
mon purpose: to comprehend the entire re-
ality.
A few decades ago the humanities
plunged into a crisis, while the natural sci-
ences astonished and amazed everyone with
its findings. Over time this led to a certain
scientific standard, a new ideal of the sci-
ences which every discipline has to submit
to. Findings need therefore to be verifiable
by observation, measurement or test, and
provided in illustrative data. However, this
is not possible for the humanities, as their
objects are not of the same nature as those
of the natural sciences. This is precisely the
foundation of the crisis in the humanities.
The humanities can now choose either:
 to transform their objects into measur-
able standards, eliminating their qualita-
tive characteristics and focusing on their
quantitative properties (Werber 2013,
174ﬀ.); or
 to be deprived of any sense or impor-
tance by the natural sciences, which for
their part got carried away with inter-
pretations of their findings, which are ex-
tremely arbitrary in terms of terminology
and methodology.
Science, whether under the absolute
leadership of the humanities or the natu-
ral sciences, is increasingly losing sight of
the goal: to grasp the entire reality. Un-
der the leadership of the natural sciences,
this objective cannot succeed, for the sim-
ple reason that the natural sciences cannot
explain science itself. Why is humankind
raising such devious questions? How could
humankind possibly understand a reality
which is probably very diﬀerent from its
perception? Why is humankind pursuing
science?
In order to make comprehensible the
proposition that natural science itself can-
not understand the nature of science, it
is first necessary to reflect on the meth-
ods of the two branches of science, which
I will hereinafter describe as measuring on
the one hand, and as hermeneutics on the
other. After a presentation of the two
methods, the various structural elements of
hermeneutics are explained, in order to re-
veal the significant shortcomings of natural
science as a leading science.
The speech is of a programmatic nature,
which is why it uses some generalizations
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that require a way more distinguished defi-
nition in an in-depth discussion of the issue.
Thus at this point, the distinction between
natural sciences and humanities should be
made in accordance with the popular un-
derstanding of their methodology. The con-
cept of a human is drawn from the Western
tradition. The human being is a subject
that confronts a world of objects. I am not
saying that this is an accurate definition
of a human, only that it is understandable
and suﬃcient for us to begin with. I hope
you will excuse these somewhat rough gen-
eralizations.
Methods of the Sciences
Usually, diﬀerent scientific fields are distin-
guished by their content, by what they in-
vestigate. Thus there are natural sciences,
which examine matter, and there are hu-
manities, which investigate inner phenom-
ena. In this understanding of science, the
method derives naturally from the nature
of the objects of the respective domains.
I want to show that the objects are not
naturally determined, but are constituted
by the method. If so, the respective scien-
tific method gains a certain precedence over
the actual contents of the sciences. I want
to develop the distinction between the two
areas of science, starting from three points
of departure:
 the scientific question;
 the procedure (method);
 the aim of the two areas.
The distinguishing feature of scientific
practice is not only to ask questions, but
to ask questions in a controlled manner,
so that the type and formulation of the
question already contains the possibility of
its answer (Plessner 1981, 176ﬀ.). A sim-
ple surprise in the form of “What’s that?”
is therefore initially useless as a scientific
question. In the natural sciences, the ques-
tions are designed to guarantee their an-
swer along with their answerability. The
question is asked in such a way that only
two alternatives are possible: Yes or no.
The scientist asks a closed question (Pless-
ner 1981, 175ﬀ.).
The answer is found by a certain proce-
dure: the experiment. In this procedure,
the relevant factors are first established,
and then all other factors are controlled
in order to keep the examined things, phe-
nomena or situations free from disturbance.
The aim is to achieve a precise measure-
ment. If this is ensured, and corresponds to
the experimental setup of the question, the
researcher obtains a guaranteed response:
yes or no.
It’s ultimately about explaining causal
relationships, reproducing and predicting
them, and designating the operating mech-
anisms – that’s the aim of the natural sci-
ences, no more, no less. For this kind of sci-
ence it’s essential not to interact with the
object of study in any way. It’s observed
from a distance. The objects shouldn’t be
perceived as pretty or ugly, desirable or re-
pulsive, or having any other property than
the predefined.
The humanities are of another nature.
Keeping a proper distance from the object
of study is a tough balancing act, as the
objects are also of a completely diﬀerent
nature. We are well aware that the objects
of history, sociology or economics are cer-
tainly physical as well: buildings, artefacts,
and bodies in “physical” interaction, such
as communication via acoustic waves or the
exchange of goods or data. But something
still needs to be added to those physical
properties of the objects, and this is “sense”.
A meaning must be attached to them. This
should not be understood as if a human
being would firstly perceive an object and
only then attach a meaning, because those
actions are not actually separate.
Thus the humanities aim to explain the
meaning of objects in every dimension,
preferably, which is never ultimately ac-
complished (Plessner 1981, 179). One link
in the chain of meaningful objects is the in-
terpreter, with his own horizon of meaning
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(Plessner 1975, 301). This is the subjec-
tive factor we need to consider when doing
research. This is a popular point of criti-
cism aimed at the humanities: accusations
that they are non-serious, and demands
that they adapt to objective mathemati-
cal methods (Wheeler 1928, 304; Wilson
1980, 271; Werber 2013, 176ﬀ.). But this
approach would be completely senseless for
the humanities. For example, studying
the printed letter “A” using every possible
chemical and physical procedure wouldn’t
lead to a convenient result. I will try to
show that the humanities can only proceed
in accordance with human “nature”, not dif-
ferently from it.
Hence it might be better to desist from
simple entanglement in the concepts of
“objective” and “true” and attach method-
ological processes to those concepts in-
stead. “Objective” would then no longer
mean “true”, which could be appropriate
for a science which merely theorizes un-
til it’s proven wrong or theorizes better.
Therefore sciences should focus on certain
methodologies which are appropriate for
their objects. Which method could meet
that criterion for the humanities, which
have, as mentioned, a subjective factor?
Apparently there is a particular type
of questioning for the humanities as well.
And, likewise, the type and formulation of
the question already contains the possibil-
ity of its answer. In contrast to the closed
question of the natural sciences, the hu-
manities can’t provide a guaranteed answer
in terms of yes or no. The question remains
open (Plessner 1981, 108f.).
To answer a question raised in the hu-
manities it is essential to include the ques-
tioning person, namely the researcher, and
therefore to reflect on his social, histor-
ical and economic state (Plessner 1981,
182). After explaining the object by mak-
ing recourse to the person of the researcher,
the explanation must be further elabo-
rated with regard to every stage of the re-
search process. This very method is what
hermeneutics is all about. I’d like to pro-
pose that this is the essence of all human-
istic research, as distinguished as the par-
ticular disciplines might appear: In anthro-
pology, the researcher, even if he has been
part of the examined culture, still needs to
describe his findings using a certain system
of categories; and in history, the researcher
will always be a part of history itself.
So what is this that we call a human be-
ing? And why is this question of impor-
tance for hermeneutics? Well, apparently
the subjective factor I mentioned is the hu-
man factor. That is why it is important
to grasp that factor for the hermeneutic
method (Lindemann 2008, 9). This is of
course just one step in the infinite dance
of hermeneutics. It is one possible step to
start with.
The Human Being
After having been shown that the objects
of science are constituted by the sciences
rather than found, one can furthermore ask
what conditions make objects of appari-
tions. Since this construction is a human
activity, a human being itself has to be
examined. This should form the basis of
hermeneutics, on which the findings of the
humanities can be relativised and revised.
Therefore the human being must be de-
scribed as a structure which is suﬃciently
formal and dynamic not to absolutise any
modus vivendi (Plessner 1981, 155). Nev-
ertheless, I will begin by explicating the
“Western” image of man. I would now like
to introduce the structure of human beings
as seen by Helmuth Plessner, which I be-
lieve to be very productive for the devel-
opment of a genuinely humanistic-scientific
method. A basic assumption for hermeneu-
tics can be developed based on this struc-
ture.
Before I explain the human structure,
one viewpoint needs to be clarified. Human
beings, as living beings, are essentially or-
ganic bodies. Living organic bodies gener-
ally realise themselves by a particular con-
figuration of their borders (Plessner 1975,
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99ﬀ.). A common feature of all organ-
isms is that they have a relationship with
their environment. This distinguishes them
from inanimate objects, for their boundary
is not only drawn virtually (for the per-
ceiving beings), but belongs to the organ-
ism, closing it oﬀ from the environment.
This limit is realised diﬀerently by diﬀerent
types of organisms. Plessner calls this reali-
sation positionality (Plessner 1975, 127ﬀ.).
From this it follows that living things al-
ways exist in a dual aspect. Firstly, they
are within their borders and, secondly, they
reach through their borders beyond them-
selves. For a body this is relatively easy to
imagine: The skin, for example, protects an
organism against external influences and at
the same time allows for a variety of ways
to get in contact with the environment, ei-
ther through heat sensations, sweating or
oxygen uptake. However, living beings are
not only physically limited. For Plessner,
humans are distinguished from other ani-
mals by their specific kind of positionality
(Plessner 1975, 291ﬀ.). More highly devel-
oped animals have a brain that ensures that
these animals can perceive. They can re-
duce themselves to a virtual point (Pless-
ner 2002, 179). For humans there comes an
“I”, in addition (Plessner 1975, 304).
How can this be explained by the prin-
ciples of limitation? For Plessner it is the
unique property of a human being to con-
struct another border right through itself.
This does not mean a duplication (Plessner
1975, 289), but rather that the human be-
ing lives on either side of this inner border.
He is aware of its limitations. Firstly, he
is just like an animal, which rises from its
centre to contact its environment because
it lives in the here and now. Secondly, he
is genuinely human, because he looks from
his border at himself. Plessner calls this an
eccentric positionality. More highly devel-
oped animals all possess a brain to ensure
that these animals can perceive. One can
be reduced to a virtual point.
I would like to clarify this by means of
the three spheres of human existence: the
physical, psychological and interpersonal.
In terms of a dual aspect, the human in-
dividual is able to watch the spheres of his
existence from his own centre, as well as
from his periphery (Plessner 2002, 185). No
sphere precedes the others; each one is like-
wise natural. In the first two dimensions,
the peripheral perspective joins the centre-
based perspective of animals. Emerging
from this dual aspect, there is however the
problem of integrating both perspectives,
for they appear to be incompatible. That
is the situation of humans.
The World of the Human Being
The first sphere I would like to examine
is the physical sphere, which Plessner calls
the external world (“Außenwelt”). The ex-
ternal world consists of all physical phe-
nomena. There is a dual aspect in a hu-
man’s perception of its own body and,
within this perception process, likewise its
perception of the environment. Both as-
pects are denoted by two diﬀerent Ger-
man terms for body: “Körper” and “Leib”.
While being factually identical to a Leib,
humans have a Körper in which they are
locked, and which at the same time is their
tool (Plessner 1975, 294). To the Leib,
space is absolute and time passes. Space is
arranged according to up, down, left, right,
front and back. Once passed, time ceases
to exist (Plessner 1975, 294).
To the Körper, space has a relative char-
acter; a human is situated in an arbitrary
place in space, no longer necessarily in the
centre. Looking at its own body from a pe-
ripheral point, the human being becomes
aware of being only one object among many
persistent objects which have a definite,
measurable distance from each other. The
human being is also not necessarily situ-
ated in the centre of its time stream (Pless-
ner 1975, 294), so past time does not van-
ish irretrievably, in the sense that it can be
traced back in principle. Points in time also
lie within measurable distances, points in
the future being computable in the present.
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That being said about the physical
sphere of human existence, a similar dual-
aspect problem exists for the psychologi-
cal sphere, which Plessner names the inner
world (“Innenwelt”). Experiences and men-
tal phenomena are the material that forms
this sphere (Plessner 1975, 295f.). The two
distinctive aspects are the central “to be
an experience” (“Erlebnis sein”) and the pe-
ripheral “to have a soul” (“Seele haben”).
Assuming that pure experience is analo-
gous to the experience of an animal, the
human being finds itself in a new situa-
tion, being able to look at itself from its
periphery and having the distance to cre-
ate an image of itself. All of a sudden
something like a fixed character appears,
which can only be changed within certain
specific rules. Furthermore, the aspect of
the soul makes it clear that the world it-
self exists independently, instead of merely
being caused by experiences. What makes
the internal world diﬀer from the external
world is that humans can apply both the
perspective of experience and the perspec-
tive of soul to the perception of the “I”, as
well as to the perception of others. This
means that the human being can look at its
own state with and without distance – with
thoughts and emotions on the one hand,
and perceptions of, for example, images or
acoustic qualities on the other.
The preceding description might create
the impression of several spheres of living
being split into two aspects each, but this
impression would be false because these as-
pects are interwoven. As the internal world
and external world relate strongly to each
other, a real internal world would be ba-
sically inconceivable without an external
world. Their depiction was selected such
that it clarifies the way phenomena become
objects in the peripheral aspect. If the pe-
ripheral aspect of the external world was
absolutised, a complete description of the
physical reality would be possible, for no
object would be missing. However, one
could no longer argue sensibly that the
world appears as arranged around a human
individual because said individual was un-
able to find itself. If one accepted the in-
terweaving of the internal and the external
world but referred only to the peripheral
aspects, one could even describe the prin-
ciples ruling the interior of living objects,
but there would still be no way of telling
whether the one doing the describing was
part of the world being described.
I claim that a restriction to peripheral
aspects is the ideal of the natural sciences.
Neither science nor any other human insti-
tution can be established that is restricted
to the central aspects of the inner and outer
worlds. It is a peculiarity of the peripheral
aspect to shape persistent objects within
its process, which is not to say that the
restriction to peripheral aspects allows the
process to be scientific. Despite a certain
completeness, the “I” would still be missing
(Nagel 1992, 27, 60).
The “I” appears in the third sphere
by the name of Mitwelt, a compound of
“with” (“mit”) and “world” (“Welt”). Ev-
ery attempt to find a proper transla-
tion of Mitwelt into English has failed.
The Mitwelt consists of the formed inter-
nal world and the formed external world
(Plessner 1975, 302). Being the dimension
of “I” and “We”, it shows up as “I” from the
central aspect and as “We” from the periph-
eral aspect. Both aspects are necessarily
mutually dependent, none stands above the
other, and the distinction between having
and being no longer works here. There is no
“I” without a counterpart. Looking at the
counterpart means looking at the other and
at oneself at the same time, hence the coun-
terpart is neither “You” nor “I” but “We”
(Plessner 1975, 301). “We” does not refer
to a given society, because this would mean
that there was some kind of matter which
the Mitwelt would consist of and arise from.
The Mitwelt is humankind in the human in-
dividual – the dimension in which one hu-
man being confronts others, in which the
foundation of culture is generated. “The
sphere of the spirit” is an alternative name
given by Plessner. What does it mean for
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a human being to confront others? How it
is possible?
I would again remind you that all of these
dimensions and aspects thereof are inextri-
cably intertwined. In the Mitwelt, humans
transform the objects and processes of the
internal and the external world and load
them with meaning. The individual can
also load its own body or the bodies of oth-
ers with meaning. Besides giving meaning
to solid objects, humans are able to give
meaning to sounds, thereby creating lan-
guages.
Up to this point I hope to have shown
that physical objects loaded with meaning
are the objects of the humanities. Due to
their nature, humans have no choice but to
express themselves, and as they are forced
to do so the possibility of analyzing oneself
becomes available. Assuming that a hu-
man being can see itself in terms of exter-
nal world, internal world and Mitwelt, it
can do so only on the basis of the dimen-
sion of the spirit. Now, I can elucidate the
basic principles of the hermeneutic method
and proceed to the anthropological laws.
The Anthropological Laws
These laws follow from the structure of hu-
man existence. The anthropological laws
that I am describing are divided into two
categories: The first is formed on the basis
of the human being as a natural being, and
the other on the basis of the human being
as a cultural being. Both of them repre-
sent two sides of the same coin and engage
with each other; only the starting point
is diﬀerent. The hermeneutical principles
that refer back to humans as natural be-
ings are the law of natural artificiality and
the law of mediated immediacy. The two
principles of the human being as a cultural
being are the law of inscrutability (“Uner-
gründlichkeit”) and the principle that hu-
mans are the attributive subject of their
world.
First of all I would like to explain the
laws of man’s emergence as a natural be-
ing. Why are humans naturally artificial?
Because a human being is divided into two
aspects and three dimensions that it can
never integrate conclusively, but must try
to again and again, and because it happens
to be the case that a human being is only
one thing, which has to repeatedly com-
plete itself and also convey itself to others
(Plessner 1975, 310). This is a never-ending
process: barely has a human being found
itself when it again becomes aware of its
disunity (Plessner 1975, 341). As I pointed
out in discussing the spheres, a human be-
ing is able to stand far behind itself in or-
der to transcend itself in the future and
the past, and thus to preserve the past in
itself and anticipate its future needs and
pleasures. Thus, the things that complete
a human being include the things that com-
plete its body (“Körperleib”), such as stocks
and homes. Since it must also complete
its inner life and take on a character, with
its highs and lows anticipated due to the
past, and convey itself to others, it not only
makes soul arrangements but sometimes in-
vests objects of its everyday life with inter-
personal meaning, and even creates things
without “practical” benefits. For example,
religion: Over time, humans create a spir-
itual world which will situate them (Pless-
ner 1975, 342). However, the time will
come when they realise that they them-
selves were the originator of that religion
and then discard it and proceed to a “true”
spirituality. The same is true for commu-
nities that match its nature best. Humans
will realize that they are much more, and
can be a lot more still (Plessner 1975, 320).
The second law is that of mediated im-
mediacy. This seemingly paradoxical no-
tion tries to encapsulate the consequences
of the twofold aspect. From this law it be-
comes clear why science is a current prob-
lem for human beings and how they have to
resolve it. From its centre, a human being
perceives everything immediately. What it
sees, it sees the way it is, what it hears,
it hears as it is. From the peripheral as-
pect it conveys to itself every phenomenon
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through itself (its border). Its body in-
trudes between its perception and reality.
Mediated immediacy means that medi-
ation is needed for being (Plessner 1975,
324). This is the human condition. In fact,
the phenomena that seem to be immediate
are actually mediate. For man is doubly
separated from reality. On the one hand,
he is stuck in his body, but on the other
hand he can still abstract from his pure “I”.
Apparently, man recognizes his fundamen-
tal separation from reality, but he is just
stuck too deep down in himself to ever be
able to achieve that reality. This is called
immanence.
However, for Plessner reality becomes
tangible only by a principled separation in
the immanence of man. The fact that he
recognizes that he is divorced from reality
gains as much importance for him as re-
ality does. The trick seems to be that it
is only by a dual separation of human be-
ings in the world that a human being gains
reality and that phenomena gain a regu-
lar and persevering character, which makes
them objects of reality (Plessner 1975, 270f,
332). The phenomena lose the character of
mere perceptions that have no external cor-
respondence. As man is thus never alone,
he must convey his situation of immanence
to others. However, reality is only consti-
tuted through double isolation from reality,
which is always questionable through dou-
ble isolation by its very nature (Plessner
1975, 330).
The human being conveys its situation
of immanence to itself and others through
expressions. These expressions take many
forms: body language, natural languages
(especially metaphors), images and other
models. This is the reason why I’m talk-
ing about this law. This is important for
the question of science as I proposed at the
outset (Plessner 1975, 330).
Before I summarise my results, I’m go-
ing to outline the two anthropological laws
from the perspective of human beings as
cultural beings. As the leading science for
these laws, Plessner selected history. If one
goes deeper into this matter, it is question-
able whether one discipline of the human-
ities is suﬃcient to understand the human
being in its comprehensive cultural aspects.
I want to start with the law of humans as
subjects of their attribution in the world.
Both laws emphasize several aspects of the
human being, as it sets out to what it is.
The human being as the subject of its
self-attribution means that a human be-
ing is both historically conditioned and his-
torically conditioning (Plessner 1981, 190).
This is the consequence of the fact that
humans have no “natural” authority above
them – neither a god nor nature nor a peo-
ple, nor anything else. He himself cre-
ates those and then submits to these con-
structs so willingly that they become sec-
ond nature to him. Man needs to under-
stand himself from his creations, but al-
low them to pass him at the same time.
This law expresses that humans are not
simply the result of their past, but rather
construe the past from their current posi-
tion. Only against the background of its
history can a human being be responsible
to itself. That is what the subject of at-
tribution means. This law is an expres-
sion of the critical humanities, which be-
came aware of their own conditions. This
critical awareness should, and has already,
become a self-understanding of the human-
ities at large. However, this critical aware-
ness must apply to all of science. As a con-
sequence, this means that there can be no
definitive progress in history. What would
be the opposite?
The opposite would be that humans
could be determined in their current sit-
uation, causally, by their past. This would
be an exact adaptation of the classical nat-
ural sciences approach to the humanities.
I don’t want to say that this is demanded
as a procedure for the humanities by the
natural sciences. However, I would like to
argue that this would be the consequence
for science. Strictly speaking, if the natu-
ral sciences try to take account of this situ-
ation, in which a theory is only valid until
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a better one is found, it would be consis-
tent to assert that there will be no clear
progress.
There is currently no clear rule concern-
ing how humans conceive their presence in
the future out of their past. Here I have
mentioned a yet-unnamed aspect of this
law. A human being indicates its past by
its presence in the future.
The second law, the inscrutability of hu-
man beings, is more radical as a scientific
imperative. This law summarises most ex-
tensively the intentions of this essay. It
has a regulatory nature for all the sciences
concerning the human being and all its ac-
tivities, even science itself (Plessner 1981,
180). As already explained, the human be-
ing is never a fixed entity due to its struc-
ture, and always projects, rejects and then
projects itself again. In fact, nothing is
necessary and definite where human beings
are concerned. There is no neutral (in the
traditional sense), objective position which
definitively captures the human being as
a whole. However, the human being cannot
help but create a picture of itself. Strictly
speaking, a human being does not even
need to understand itself as a human be-
ing. It could also understand itself as an
animal or a rational being. It is also pos-
sible that it never questions its existence,
but exists only in its habits and daily life.
Therefore, what a human being is must re-
main an open question. For the sciences,
this means that they cannot take a posi-
tion from which they try to fathom what
a human being is, both in the disciplines as
well as in the methodological foundations.
A hermeneutic, i. e. humanistic, considera-
tion of the human being must be aware of
its own boundaries.
Back to the Point: Sciences
How could all those general considerations
of the human being, which shall provide
the foundation for a new method, illumi-
nate the question of the nature or sense of
the sciences? Well, what is true for the hu-
man being as a natural and artificial being
is also true for its surroundings, especially
for culture. Science is part of human cul-
ture, which makes it an object of the hu-
manities.
One topic could be the study of the his-
tory of science, which does not reveal clear
progress (e. g. biology). A diﬀerent topic
could be the question of the meaning of
sciences, which would not reveal a singu-
lar and ultimate meaning.
There are a plurality of meanings of the
sciences in a society. For some, the sci-
ences might be an ideology, the fundamen-
tals of a worldview. For others, they are the
means to subdue the world, an approach
probably represented best in sociology. An-
other meaning of science is science as an
end in itself, which could mean two things:
Firstly, science satisfies the human thirst
for knowledge; secondly, it’s up to the sci-
ences to evolve methods that clarify the
conditions of the possibilities of knowledge
about the world, and to generalize these
methods. This is also the aim of this pre-
sentation.
On the other hand, it has to be possi-
ble to consider cultural aspects with a view
of the natural sciences, as is done, for
example, in the neurosciences. Another
task of the various disciplines is to sup-
port and criticise each other, in order to
produce interdisciplinary research deserv-
ing this name. Until then, for the sake of
science as a whole, the humanities need to
apply, develop and refine their own meth-
ods.
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